PRESKA, J.

*1 Plaintiffs move for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ß 1988. Defendants concede for purposes of these motions that plaintiffs are prevailing parties within the meaning of the statute and are entitled to recover reasonable fees and disbursements. (Defendant' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Application for Attorneys' Fees dated October 22, 2001 ("Def.Br.") at 1). The only question presented is the reasonableness of such fees.

Plaintiffs Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co., Inc. ("Santa Fe") and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and BWTDirect, LLC (the "B & W Plaintiffs") commenced these actions on or about September 26, 2000 and October 12, 2000, respectively, seeking a declaration that Section 1399-11 of the New York Public Health Law violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, an injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing the statute, and such further relief as the Court deemed proper, including attorneys' fees, costs and expenses pursuant to Section 1988. On October 23, 2000, the First Scheduling Order was issued setting dates for discovery, briefing, a preliminary injunction hearing on November 27, 2000, and oral argument on December 13, 2000. The schedule contemplated an expedited, labor-intensive, and accelerated process necessitated by (1) defendants' refusal to agree to stay enforcement of Section 1399-11 for a few weeks pending a preliminary injunction hearing (thus requiring plaintiffs to seek a temporary restraining order preventing the statute from taking effect on November 14, 2000, as scheduled); and (2) defendants' refusal to consent to an extension of the temporary restraining order, if issued (thus requiring plaintiffs to conduct discovery under an accelerated schedule looking toward a preliminary injunction decision following argument in mid-December 2000).

The TRO was issued on November 13, 2000 (Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Spitzer, 2000 WL 1694307 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000))--three weeks after accelerated discovery under the First Scheduling Order had begun. The next day, November 14, defendants offered to consent to a three-week extension of the TRO to permit the parties to make fuller evidentiary showings at the preliminary injunction hearing. The B & W Plaintiffs responded in a letter on the same date that a longer extension should be granted to allow the preliminary injunction hearing to be consolidated with the trial on the merits, thereby obviating the need for a second evidentiary proceeding and a third oral argument. On November 15, 2000, a Second Scheduling Order was issued setting the preliminary injunction hearing for February 6, 2001, oral argument on March 9 (based on Defendants' consent to extend the TRO through March 16, 2001) and reserving decision on consolidation.

*2 On February 26, 2001, defendants' disqualification motion was denied. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 152 F.Supp.2d 276 (S.D.N.Y.2001). In addressing issues raised by that motion, I noted that the accelerated schedule in the case was the result of defendants' request for expedited proceedings after issuance of the TRO and that defendants' decision in that regard "is not without consequences." Id. at 290. I also noted that it was "clear that [defendants] made a tactical decision at the outset [of the case] not to seek ... disqualification (or at least raise the issue) and instead chose to pursue expedited proceedings" and that defendants, having done so, "must accept the consequence." Id.

On April 24, 2001, over the objection of defendants, the trial on the merits was consolidated with the preliminary injunction hearing, and a five-day bench trial commenced on April 30, 2001. Oral argument was held on May 30, 2001, and on June 8, 2001, an opinion was issued holding Section 1399-11 unconstitutional and permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing it. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Spitzer, 2001 WL 636441 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2001).

42 U.S.C. ß 1988(b) provides that "... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs...." The district court is given broad discretion in assessing a reasonable attorney's fee based on the circumstances of each case and is advised not to undertake a tedious analysis of every aspect of the attorney's representation. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); see also New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir.1983) ("In assessing the extent of staffing and background research appropriate for a given case, a district court must be accorded ample discretion.").

Within the Second Circuit, the lodestar method may be used to ascertain attorney's fees in civil rights cases. See Quararino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422 (2d Cir.1999); see also Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir.2000) (either lodestar or "percentage of the recovery" method may be used in common fund cases). The lodestar method calculates fees by using the product of the number of hours reasonably expended by each attorney and the reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; Quararino, 166 F.2d at 425; Gavin-Mouklas v. Information Builders, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 3085(LAP), 1999 WL 728636, at super* 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that the rates requested and the number of hours expended was reasonable. See Stratton v. Department for the Aging, No. 91 Civ. 6623(SAS), 1996 WL 352909, at super* 2- super* 3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34). "Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good fath effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary...." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

*3 To assess the reasonableness of the time expended by an attorney, the court must look first to the time and work as they are documented by the attorney's records. See Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6953(LAP), 1998 WL 879710, at super* 2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1998). Next the court looks to "its own familiarity with the case and its experience generally.... Because attorneys' fees are dependent on the unique facts of each case, the resolution of the issue is committed to the discretion of the district court." AFP Imaging Corp. v. Phillips Medizin Sys., No. 92 Civ. 6211(LMM), 1994 WL 698322, at super* 1 (S .D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1994) (quoting Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.1985))).

To assess the reasonableness of the billing rates employed, courts look to market rates " 'prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonable comparable skill, experience and reputation." ' Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 852 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 11 (1984)); see Carey, 711 F.2d at 1151. Because this action was litigated in the Southern District of New York, the prevailing community rates would normally be those of Manhattan attorneys of reasonably comparable skill and experience for similar litigation. See Polk v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir.1983); Gavin-Mouklas, 1999 WL 728636, at super* 2. Here, as to those timekeepers based in Manhattan, I have considered prevailing Manhattan rates for comparable counsel. Plaintiffs' fee requests for timekeepers located other than in Manhattan are based on those timekeepers' regular, non-Manhattan billing rates--rates which, not surprisingly, are lower than Manhattan rates. Accordingly, I have considered the rates requested by out-of-town counsel in comparison to comparable lawyers in the relevant out-of-town location. In determining the prevailing rate, courts also factor in the size of the law firm involved; lawyers at large firms generally recover more per hour than lawyers at small firms. Chambers v. Masters, 885 F.2d 1053, 1059 (2d Cir.1989). In addition, district court judges may rely on their own knowledge of rates charged by lawyers in the district. E.g., Miele v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir.1987).

Finally, billing judgment must be factored into the equation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; DiFilippo, 759 F.2d at 235-36. If a court finds that the fee applicant's claim is excessive, or that time spent was wasteful or duplicative, it may decrease or disallow certain hours or, where the application for fees is voluminous, order an across-the-board percentage reduction in compensable hours. In re "Agent Orange" Products Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 237 (2d Cir.1987) (stating that "in cases in which substantial numbers of voluminous fee petitions are filed, the district court has the authority to make across- the-board percentage cuts in hours 'as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application" ' (quoting Carey, 711 F.2d at 1146)); see also United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir.1989) (approving a percentage reduction of total fee award to account for vagueness in documentation of certain time entries).

*4 The determination of the final "lodestar" amount is not necessarily the end of the inquiry; in some cases where constitutional claims are involved, the court may adjust the lodestar amount based on a variety of factors. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974); Foster v. Kings Park Cent. School Dist., 174 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y.1997). These factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the question; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Foster, 174 F.R.D. at 27. With all of the above considerations in mind, I turn to the litigation at hand.

It is with abundant understatement that defendants acknowledge that the litigation "was fast-paced and, at times, challenging," (Def. Br. at 1), and that the effort involved was "not insubstantial," (Id. at 2). The factual inquiries were novel and complex. They included, for example, review of reams of statistical studies purporting to show a relationship between, for example, (1) the cost of cigarettes and demand among particular age groups, (2) the cost of cigarettes and the volume of cross-border sales, and (3) enforcement of a variety of tobacco-related regulations and demand among particular age groups. Inquiry into the legislative history of the statute was also required. The legal issues presented were equally complex, involving, for example, sophisticated Commerce Clause analysis, inquiry into New York State tax regulations and United States Postal Service regulations as applied to cigarettes and questions of State Executive privilege. Also presented on the disqualification motion was an issue of first impression of who is the client in a governmental context. See Roy Simon, Simon's New York Code of Professional Responsibility Annotated 473-74 (2002). In my judgment, the factual and legal issues presented in this action were far more challenging than those presented in the normal civil rights case. See Foster, 174 F .R.D. at 19 (considering novelty and difficulty of the question presented).

*5 The experience, reputation and ability of plaintiffs' counsel, also a Foster factor, were all first rate. All of the counsel involved in the action are presently [FN1] large firm practitioners, thus commanding higher rates in general. Chambers, 885 F.2d at 1059. As set forth more specifically below, the attorneys involved here demonstrated the highest level of experience, expertise and ability in litigating this action. [FN2]

Another Foster factor is the result obtained. Here the result was spectacular; counsel obtained all the relief sought in record time under difficult circumstances. It was a result private clients would be, and apparently were, happy to pay for, a result made more likely by utilization of top-of-the-line litigators who, from my review of the contemporaneous time entries and summaries, left no stone unturned. This maximum force litigation effort, while admirable and highly effective here, in some instances was above and beyond the standard of reasonableness applicable under ß 1988. Section 1988 authorizes the reimbursement of reasonable fees and expenses, not reimbursement of fees and expenses necessary to maximize the chances of success. Here, where I am being asked to shift the plaintiffs' costs of this litigation to the People of the State of New York, I must adhere to the reasonableness standard of ß 1988 and heed the Court of Appeals' caution that attorney's fees are to be awarded " 'with an "eye to moderation," ' seeking to avoid either the reality or the appearance of awarding 'windfalls." ' Evans v. State of Connecticut, 967 F.Supp. 673, 691 (D.Conn.1997) (quoting Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir.1977)).

Based on the record on these motions and my own knowledge of billing rates, plaintiffs have demonstrated the reasonableness of the rates applicable to all of the timekeepers at issue (after counsel's billing judgment reductions). Although the rates are higher than those commonly seen in civil rights litigation, the issues presented, both factual and legal, were far more complex than those commonly seen. [FN3] With minor exceptions (for example, describing tasks as "odds and ends" (Remes Decl. Ex. D, December 2000 time sheets, line 184)), counsel's contemporaneous time records comply with the requirements of Carey, 711 F.2d 1138, that is, they "overall are sufficiently detailed to allow the court to assess the reasonableness of the time spent," Burr v. Sobel, 748 F.Supp. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y.1990). The only question, then, is the number of hours reasonably expended, a question that in some instances includes the number of attorneys involved. Because of the volume of the time sheets submitted, I will not detail each individual time entry (or part of an entry) here but will focus on the "big picture," id., and adjust the hours to meet the reasonableness standard of ß 1988 by means of across- the-board percentage cuts, where appropriate, see In re "Agent Orange", 818 F.2d at 237 (quoting Carey ); United States Football League, 887 F.2d at 415.

Defendants do object to the hourly rates billed by the Salans firm. Based on the material in the record and on my own knowledge of firm billing rates, however, I find the rates of all of the timekeepers at the Salans firm to be entirely reasonable for large-firm Manhattan practitioners in light of Mr. Velie's and Ms. Burgman's high level of experience, expertise and performance and in light of the complex legal and factual issues presented here. (See Declaration of Lawrence Silverman in Support of the Petition executed July 31, 2001 (the "Silverman Decl."), Ex. B (RLS Legal Services, Inc. listing of rates requested by large New York firms); Velie Supp. Decl. Ex. A (A Firm-by-Firm Sampling of Billing Rates Nationwide, Nat'l Law J., Dec. 18, 2000, at B14); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, No. 98 CV 3287(JBW), 2002 WL 397224, at super* 15 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (awarding fee based on average partner billing rate of $540 per hour for large New York firms in complex case).

As noted above, the applicable rates after write-offs are reasonable for counsel (and other timekeepers) of this experience and level of performance on a matter of this complexity, based on my own knowledge of billing rates and on the material in the record showing rates of other large law firms experienced in complex litigation in Washington and New York. (See Remes Decl. Ex. C (RLS Legal Services, Inc. listing of rates requested by various Washington, D.C.- based firms); Silverman Decl. Ex. B (RLS Legal Services, Inc. listing of rates requested by various New York-based firms); Velie Supp. Decl. Ex. A (A Firm-by- Firm Sampling of Billing Rates Nationwide, Nat'l Law J., Dec. 18, 2000, at B14)); Blue Cross, 2002 WL 397224, at super* 15 (awarding fee based on average partner billing rate of $540 per hour for large New York firm in complex case)).

The number of hours billed, however, is a different matter. Private clients can, of course, agree to pay for any number of lawyers and hours on a matter. Indeed, the plaintiffs here were no doubt delighted with the superlative results expeditiously achieved and have paid the bills as rendered. As noted above, however, the standard under Section 1988 is more moderate and, in my view, does not contemplate the "deep bench" approach to litigation staffing. Although the deep bench approach might well be commercially acceptable under circumstances such as those presented in this action, it is not widely accepted, even in commercial matters, [FN4] and is certainly not within the reasonableness standard of Section 1988.

At the Heronimas deposition on November 13, Messrs. Remes and Silverman, the two most senior C & B lawyers on the case, billed a total of some 22 hours, together with additional time by an associate for preparation. These and other examples of multiple lawyers where fewer would be reasonable convince me that a 20% reduction in C & B's fee is appropriate. See In re "Agent Orange", 818 F.2d at 237 (authorizing across-the-board percentage cuts in hours "as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application") (quoting Carey, 711 F.2d at 1146).

Plaintiffs are prevailing parties and are awarded the following fees and disbursements through October 31, 2001 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ß 1988: